Phi202

Wk 2.2 More Anti-realism.

Some arguments for the prime anti-realist doctrine that tend to be invoked by anti-realists who are not relativists.

The argument is that moral properties do not seem to bear the relation to observation that you would expect a real property to bear. With uncontroversially real properties, e.g. the scientific property of being a proton, when you move an instance (e.g via a bubble-chemical track) the fast that it is an in of the property helps explain the fact of your making the ok judgement. In contrast, supposedly, when you observe an instance of wrongness, the fact that the act was an instance of wrongness was not needed to explain your judgement. All that's needed to explain your moral judgement is the fact that such acts are treated as wrong by the group in which you were brought up. You would have made the judgement whether or not the act was really wrong, as long as your upholding the remained unaltered.

Respones the non-moral judgement can be explained in the same way, invoking only the fact that the scientific community in which you were treats the bubbles as evidence of a proton. Leeping your thinking you would have made the same judgement if there were no protons.

This illustrates the anti-realist idea that one way or another moral