Phi202

wk5 Consequentialism/utilitarianism

Consequentialisms all counsel that we act for 'the greatest good of the greatest number'/ Different versions have different accounts of the nature of that good.

-Hedonic utilitarianism: one should maximise overall pleasure

-Preference utilitarianism satisfaction: one should maximise one satisfaction of people's preferences

PArt of hte advantage of an account which has pleasure as the godot o be maximised is as follows: it's not overwhelmingly implausible, at first glance at least, that pleasure is in fact the ultimate good to which all other goods are mere means. Further, its not overwhelmingly implausible that pleasure, whether or not it's in fact such a good, is often treated as such, i.e that it is what motivates us. (these two don't have to go together.)

One can argue taht, e.g God's commands being fulfilled, are the ultimate good, without assuming that everyone (or even anyone)pursues or seeks or is motivated by such a good.

This is an advantage of Academic utilitarianism because the fact that people ultimately pursie it is a plausibility argument for the conclusion that it is in fact such a good, i .e ought to be pursued. Bentham would feel that this allows us to justify our claims about ultimate goods concretely - otherwise what's stopping you from claiming what ever you like?

Preference - satisfaction utilitarianism has similar advantages. You argue that it is good that people's preferences be satisfied (Actually this is less obviously plausibly than the pleasure case) And you argue that people are motivated by having their preferences satisfied that i am motivated by ? Good question!)

This advantage is part of what makes these views utilitarianism, as opposed to consequentialism, in general.

Not all consequentialisms have it. E.G G.E Moose felt that the ultimate goods were personal affection and relations, and aesthetic experience. It is not obvious that we are typically motivated by these, even if they are genuinely ultimate goods.

This makes the term 'ideal utilitarianism' for Moose' view something of a misnomer. (Reasons for this are rarely made clear).

Another reason why hedonic and preference satisfaction views are genuinely utilitarian and Moore's isn't, is that the former assume that there is a geniuinely ultimate single good to which all others can be reduced. As a result there is only a (technical/calculational mystery in the former as to what to do)

See williams for genuine utilitarians, all goods are commensurable.

There is a connection between this issue and the most standard anti-utilitarian argument.: that individuals, there are certain rules that one cannot rightly violate, even, if it would in some sense lead to a greater quantity of good to do so. E.g. you can't justify killing one innocent man to save the five sick people even though it might seem that the the overall outcome would be better. Because doing so would violate the one man's rights. The intuition is that you can't just weigh up the good results for the against the bad outcome for the organ doner. (You might think you can factor in the fact that you are noting to kill as an independent factor which adds badness. But this is against the consequentialist principle that the act itself gets all its moral weight is from its consequences.) Utilitariniasm seems to say that there are no exceptionless rules. Generally it is wrong to kill the innocent, but if enough good reults, it is obligatory.